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 Abstract 
 
In 1998, the Philippines introduced book-building pricing mechanisms for Initial 
Public Offerings. Almost all capital raised through IPOs in the Philippines is done using a 
book-building pricing method, however a significant number of IPOs still occur using 
non-book-building methods. Understanding why book-building has become the dominant 
pricing mechanism but yet non-book-building methods still survive is the aim of this 
paper. I find that unlike other countries where the introduction of book-building leads to 
higher total issue costs for individual issuers and unlike theory which suggests the 
increased effort of book-building should come with increased costs, IPOs that use book-
built pricing in the Philippines actually have a lower total issue cost as a percentage of the 
total issue size compared to issuers who use non-book-building methods. This being the 
case, explaining why non-book-built IPOs still occur is even more interesting. I find that 
the large variance in size and the low volume of IPOs in the Philippines creates a 
bifurcated market where it is uneconomical for underwriters to use book-building to 
service small firms who want to IPO. The harder phenomenon to explain is the choice by 
firms who are large enough to book-build to use non-book-built methods. I suggest that 
the developing sophistication of the local market as well as the relationship driven aspect 
of business in the Philippines are two possible explanations.   
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I. Introduction 
 
Though public offerings have been out of fashion in the US market recently with 
large private funding rounds allowing companies to stave off an appetite for the public 
markets, the Initial Public Offering (IPO) market in Asia-Pacific hasn’t gotten the memo. 
The APAC region leads in terms of deal number and proceeds through the first 9 months 
of 2015 and Japan is on course to have the best year for IPOs since 2007
1
.  
An Initial Public Offering is the first offering of a company’s equity to public 
investors and is a major source of capital for growing firms. The decision to IPO is a 
major event in the life of any company. IPOs are complex processes that can take several 
months as the company works with their retained teams of several parties including 
banks, law firms and accountants on the offering. Arguably the biggest decision the 
offering firm has to make after making the decision to IPO is how to price the offering. In 
a small set of countries, regulatory bodies only allow one type of pricing method. 
Indonesia, for example, only allows companies to IPO using a fixed-price mechanism. 
The majority of countries with functioning public equity markets however allow firms to 
choose between the three types of pricing methods or a combination of them, these being: 
fixed
2
, auction, and book-building. Globally, book-building is the pricing method of 
choice. Sherman (2000) shows that in more than forty markets where book-building is 
available it has become the pricing mechanism of choice. Understanding why has been 
                                                          
1
 "EY - IPO Global Trends 2015 Q2 - Asia-Pacific Is the Standout Region." Ernst Young. Accessed 
November 30, 2015. http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/Strategic-Growth-Markets/ey-ipo-global-trends-
2015-q2-asia-pacific-is-the-standout-region. 
2
 By “fixed price”, I refer to any method where the final offer price is determined through calculations 
performed by the underwriter. The calculations and formulas used do not have to be standardized however 
and thus the fixed price calculation for one IPO may be different from another.  
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the subject of various different theoretical and empirical studies which will be explored in 
more depth in section 2 of this paper.  
Nevertheless, the consensus so far seems to be that in developed markets the 
benefits of pricing via book-building are clear empirically. In the US (whether the book-
building system originated) or Japan for example, there has been little push back on the 
dominance of book-building. Attempts to disrupt the system by firms such as W.R. 
Hambrecht who offers auction-priced IPOs in the US have resulted in, at most, moderate 
success. In developing markets however there the evidence is still unclear as to whether 
book-building has helped the market. In India, Kumar (2008) finds that from a total cost 
point of view, issuers are neither better nor worse off under the Indian book-building 
system. In Bangladesh, Islam et al. (2006) find that the benefits to the market are unclear 
given the shortage of large, sophisticated investors and in 2011 Bangladeshi regulators 
suspended book-building as a pricing mechanism, blaming it for the market debacle that 
the country experienced in 2010.  
As a student of the developed markets but a native of the Philippines, whether or 
not a recently introduced financial mechanism makes the market, its participants and 
ultimately the greater economy better or worse off concerns me on a personal level. This 
study seeks to add value to the developing field of literature on the topic in the 
Philippines by answering two questions: 1) Why do most firms in the Philippines choose 
to use a book-building method as opposed to a non-book-building method (including 
auctions, fixed-price or any other method that does not use an explicit book-building 
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process) and 2) What firm-specific variables predict whether a firm will use book-
building pricing methods or non-book-building pricing methods. 
II. Literature Review  
A significant volume of literature is devoted to trying to explain why the 
overwhelming majority of issuers elect to use book-building mechanisms rather than 
auctions or fixed price offerings when they have the choice of using any of the three. 
Broadly, in markets free markets where IPO pricing isn’t directly determined by 
regulators, there are three major parties that could influence the decision. The first is the 
investors in the market whose response to different IPOs influences the type of IPOs the 
market chooses, the second is the underwriting banks who provide the pricing services 
and will usually recommend a certain type to the issuing company if retained, and third is 
the issuing company themselves who directly makes the decision of what type of IPO to 
pursue.  
Jagannathan et al. (2010) hypothesize that it is investors, specifically 
sophisticated and institutional investors that make up most of the market volumn, that 
drive the decision and that the difficulty associated with auction based methods leads to 
investor behavior that is detrimental to the issuer. They argue that the primary investors 
in the market, large institutional investors, discourage non-book-built pricing methods 
since they allocate shares on a prorata basis leading to a smaller allocation on average for 
institutional investors compared to book-building. Furthermore, Jagannathan and 
Sherman (2006) in another paper argue that the free rider problem and winner’s curse 
discourage informed investors from participating in auction-based IPOs. Informed 
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investors, usually institutional investors, prefer book-building because it rewards them for 
their sophistication by getting more shares at a better price at the time of IPO since 
underwriters take into account institutional investors’s information during the price 
setting period. In an auction IPO, uninformed investors are also allowed to bid which 
creates a lot of noise when setting the price and because shares are allocated from highest 
bid to lowest, investors who overbid not only move the price away from the “correct” 
price but also take away potential allocation from those who bid at the “correct” price. In 
terms of fixed-price offerings, even if bids aren’t solicited from uninformed investors, all 
sophisticated investors still aren’t rewarded for their information and thus, as Sherman 
(2005) puts it, they feel like their time evaluating the offer is wasted.  
Alternatively, some authors argue it is the underwriting banks that drive the 
choice of regime. Ausubel (2002) states that investment banks have an incentive to 
pressure issuers to choose book-building because of the higher fees banks receive in 
return for the additional effort and time spent on book-built offerings. Additionally, as 
documented by Sherman (2002), given that underwriters determine the allocation of the 
shares in a book-built process and there is strong evidence that underwriters underprice
3
, 
banks also have the incentive to pressure issuers to use book-building so that they can 
allocate the underpriced shares to important clients in order to build and deepen 
relationships. Degeorge et al. (2007) states that the information gathering process of 
book-building, which includes public presentations of the company by management and 
more disclosure of company information prior to final pricing, and longer time frame 
                                                          
3
  Ausubel (2002), Aggarwal et al. (2001), Hanley and Hoberg (2011) all find underpricing in their samples 
of book-built IPOs and cite causes such as litigation risk for underwriting banks and a desire for issuers to 
see a “pop” as reasons for systematic underpricing  
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results in more coverage from analysts. This enhances the demand for the deal, but also 
gives the underwriters themselves more publicity and better relationships with analysts. 
The last major stakeholder that could drive the decision is issuers themselves. 
Sherman (2002) finds that expected number of shares sold under book-building is higher, 
risk of undersubscription is lower, and book-building allows the issuer to control 
spending on information acquisition (thus giving control over expected proceeds). In an 
expansion of her paper, Sherman (2005) concludes that because more control over the 
offering and less risk are qualities sought by any issuer, this explains why global trends of 
issuer choice of book-building are so consistent. After looking at the case of Japan, 
Kutsuna and Smith (2003) argue that net issue proceeds are what determine the regime 
that results in the most capital raised from the IPO minus total issue costs.  Because the 
individual total issue cost of most issuers in their sample is higher under book-building, 
individual total issue costs savings cannot explain the shift to book-building and 
individual issuer preference alone cannot answer the why book-building seems to drive 
all auctions out of favor in Japan. Kutsuna and Smith conclude that the benefits to the 
whole market and not a specific group of stakeholders due to the lower aggregate total 
issue cost (when results are weighted by issue size rather than equally weighting and 
taking into account opportunity costs related to underinvestment) and due to partly 
redistributive effects of more-accurate pricing is what determines the regime of IPO 
pricing that prevails. Kutsuna and Smith however end on the statement that whether or 
not there is a role for other IPO processes outside book-building “depends partly on the 
mix of potential issuers”.  
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Considering previous literature reveals nuances to the questions of why book-
building becomes the pricing mechanism of choice and what firms choose it. First, it 
seems undisputed that book-building should result in less uncertainty and thus better 
performance of IPOs, the tradeoff in other markets however is the higher cost associated 
with book-building. Thus examining whether the tradeoff exists in the Philippine market 
and, assuming it does, assessing whether the higher costs are justified is one of the 
important objectives of this paper. Second, the benefits of book-building are repeatedly 
found to be dependent on the scale of issuing firms, whether that be in terms of issue size 
or market cap, and the information asymmetry associated with the company. Thus, 
another important objective in this paper is examining whether the size of a firm and the 
amount of information asymmetry of a firm in the Philippines predict the decision to 
book-build. In the pursuit of these objectives, understanding the institutional backdrop of 
the Philippines is of high importance.  
III. Institutional Overview
4
 
The Philippine stock market:   
The current Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE), the sole stock exchange in the 
Philippines, started in 1992 as a result of the unification of the Manila Stock exchange, 
which was organized in 1927, and the Makati Stock Exchange, which was organized in 
1963. Companies on the exchange are classified according to 7 sector categories: 
financial, industrial, holding firms, property, services, and mining and oil. As of June 8 
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 As a result of poor online documentation of many PSE and SEC requirements, most information is taken 
from interviews with industry professionals which are cited in the References section. 
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2015, there were 263 companies listed with an aggregate market capitalization of 
14,496B Php
5
.    
Originally, companies IPO-ed and were listed on the First Board, Secord Board, 
or the Small and Medium Enterprises Board with the board determined by profitability, 
growth, market capitalization, age and net tangible assets. In 2013, the PSE adopted a 
new listing board structure, consolidating the 3 previous boards into the Main Board and 
the SME Board each with more comprehensive listing requirements. In general, larger 
companies with longer operating histories are listed on the Main Board while smaller and 
younger companies are listed on the SME Board (for more details refer to tables 1 and 2).  
Tax considerations: 
 Preferential tax treatment is granted to sales of shares during an IPO. A tax rate of 
50bps of transaction value is applied during the IPO compared to the capital gains tax of 
10% - 20% one would have to pay on the sale of shares normally. In exchange for this 
preferential tax treatment policy, the government set in place IPO distribution 
requirements intended to allow Filipino retail customers to share in the upside of the 
company.  
IPO distribution requirements: 
In general, the SEC requires underwriters to distribute 20% of the base deal to 
Trading Participants (TP’s) who are a collection of mostly small, PSE-registered brokers, 
10% to local small investors (LSI’s) with the remaining 70% to be sold to the general 
                                                          
5
 http://www.pse.com.ph/stockMarket/marketInfo-marketActivity.html?tab=0 
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public (the majority of this tranche is usually allocated to Qualified Institutional Buyers 
(QIB’s)). This 70% allocation to QIBs is also referred to as the book-building process 
however this does not refer to the pricing process of the IPO rather it just refers to the 
determination of allocation. Taking a fixed price IPO as an example, the price may be 
determined through a fixed-price method however if the offering is oversubscribed, 
meaning the number of shares demanded by investors is greater than the number of 
shares being sold, how many shares each QIB receives is determined through what is also 
called the book-building process. These percentage distribution requirements are unique 
to the Philippines and both underwriters and the PSE have called for reform for what they 
say is an antiquated and unfair securities code. Underwriters claim the option for TP’s to 
return their allocation to underwriters essentially gives the trading participants a free 
option on the shares. Furthermore, the 10% allocation requirement to small local 
investors frustrates underwriters due to the low take-up rates from the tranche (which can 
be as low as 2%). In practice, this motivates underwriters to prefer a book-building 
pricing mechanism since it allows them to try and get demand to cover 100% of the deal 
with institutional investors so that the deal is still covered in the case of weak demand 
from the TP and LSI tranches.  
Listing by way of introduction: 
 Listing by way of introduction applies to situations where a company will list on 
the PSE but no public offering will be undertaken because the securities for which the 
listing is sought would be of such an amount and would be so widely held that their 
adequate marketability when listed can be assumed. Broadly, listing by way of 
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introduction can also occur when listing in an exchange or public offering is mandated by 
law or be the SEC or other government agencies. 
The non-book-building regime:  
Pre-1998, IPO issuers in the Philippines had the choice between fixed-price, 
auction, or hybrid offering methods. With a fixed-price offering, if the company was to 
be listed on the Third Board the shares of the company were required to be priced at par 
value (1 Php). Most companies however listed on the First or Second Boards where the 
underwriter would determine a price based on their own determined factors such as PE 
ratio, prevailing market conditions, historical performance, estimates of the business 
potential and earnings prospects, assessment of company's management and 
consideration of above factors in relation to the market valuation of companies in related 
businesses. This price would be the final price shares were offered to investors at during 
an IPO.  
In contrast, with an auction-price offering, bids which are solicited from investors 
who want allocation from the IPO are used to set the price of the shares. A hybrid-price 
offering would be an IPO that utilizes both methods to set the price of different tranches 
of shares during the offering. During the non-book-building regime, fixed price offerings 
dominated. In fact, in my data set only one company during the non-book-building 
regime did not use the fixed price method.
6
 During this regime, pricing methods did not 
prevent systematic underpricing. Sullivan and Unite (1998) found that during the 11 year 
period of 1987-1997 first day initial returns of 104 IPOs averaged 22.69%. 
                                                          
6
 Petron Corporation’s (PCOR) IPO in Sept. 1994 utilized a hybrid-price offering, with a fixed-price 
offering tranche and a “tender-price” offering tranche (auction-based) 
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The book-building regime:  
Under book-building, the underwriter gathers information from primarily 
institutional investors. Similar to the fixed-price method, the underwriter will 
independently determine a price range that they expect the IPO to price at. Subsequently, 
unlike other pricing methods, through discussions undergone during a “road show”, a 
typically one to two week long process that involves management presentations and one-
on-one meetings with selected investors, the underwriter will assess the level of interest / 
demand from investors and determine where in the range the price should be set. The 
higher the demand, the closer to the upper part of the price range the offering price is set. 
In exceptional cases, the underwriter may even chose to create a new range of prices if 
demand turns out to be much higher or lower than expected. In the case of exceptionally 
low demand, the issuer may choose not to issue, thus firms that end up IPO-ing usually 
price within the expected range or better. Under the Philippine book-building method, the 
offer price need not be linked to the value of comparable companies. Furthermore, 
perhaps the biggest differentiator for book-building is that gives underwriters greater 
control over allocation of the shares. Under non-book-building mechanisms shares are 
allocated prorata, however in the book-building process the underwriter has discretion 
over the allocation of the shares.  This incentivizes truthful bids from investors during a 
book-building process as their potential reward is the allocation of underpriced shares, as 
discussed in Benveniste and Spindt (1989). Thus while nothing bars underwriters from 
going on a roadshow and asking for indications of interests during a non-book-building 
process, because underwriters have no control over allocation investors have no incentive 
to give accurate representations of price. In general, the book-building process is 
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associated with higher effort on the part on the underwriter to market the IPO and gather 
information on demand. 
The IPO of Philippine Seven Corporation (SEVN) in February 1998 is the first 
time a book-building method is mentioned in regards to setting the offering price of the 
IPO. It is unclear what specifically motivated the introduction of book-building pricing, 
however the time period of the late 1990’s was a time of major change in the Philippine 
markets and in East Asian markets in general, among these changes were: The increase in 
Western institutional investors opening East Asian (ex-Japan) emerging market funds and 
migration of talent from Wall Street and London to Asia, increase in privations which 
needed broader and deeper institutional investor support, the Asian Financial Crisis of 
1997-2004 and the emergence of smaller, earlier-stage companies. These factors point to 
a spread of Western capital markets knowledge, a growing sophistication in institutional 
investors and an era of increased complexity and uncertainty in the public markets. Book-
building, which gives underwriters and issuers more control over the offering and relies 
on sizable and knowledged institutional investors, would logically be a sought after tool. 
Sherman’s (2002) empirical findings that book-building has become the preferred pricing 
method for IPOs in 44 countries and Ljungqvist et al’s (2003) and Sherman’s (2005) 
conclusions that book-building tends to drive out other pricing methods in markets that it 
has been introduced are testaments to this. While companies still have the option of 
choosing fixed-price or auction-based pricing methods, Book-building since introduction 
has become the favored method of IPO pricing in the Philippines with 42 out of the 70 
IPOs from 1998-2015 choosing to use a book-building process. Nevertheless, unlike 
markets like Japan where book-building since introduction has completely driven out 
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other pricing methods, the Philippine market still has a significant amount of IPO’s 
utilizing non-book-building methods. As can be seen in figure 5, the prominence of book-
building has grown as time has progressed however even in recent years non-book-built 
offerings are still observable. 
IV. Data Description 
 To study the book-building regime in the Philippines, I use a sample of all 70 
companies that IPO-ed on the PSE from the start of 1998 through August of 2015. The 
data set does not include companies that listed by way of introduction or listed through 
way of a reverse merger
7
 due to the significantly different nature of the transactions. As 
can be seen in figure 5, over recent years there still have been a number of non-book-built 
IPOs however, as figure 6 shows, they make up a small amount of the volume.  
 Data on proceeds, price, board, sector, aftermarket price and market cap at 
issuance was provided by the library of the PSE. Additional details such as historical 
financials, nature of shareholders, underwriter details and fees, use of proceeds, firm age, 
number of employees, and classification of pricing mechanism were collected from the 
final prospectuses filed with the PSE by the IPO-ing companies. Underwriter fees are 
inclusive of fees paid to selling agents due to most prospectuses not stating the distinct 
portion that would go only to the underwriters. IPOs were classified as either book-built 
or non-book-built by looking at the “Determination of Offer Price” section of each 
prospectus. While the wording of the section is left to the discretion of the issuer and its 
advisors, the SEC requires firms to explicitly mention if a book-building process was 
                                                          
7
 The acquisition of a listed public company by a private company  
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used to price the shares (as can be seen in figure 4). Thus if a prospectus did not 
explicitly mention book-building in the “Determination of Offer Price” section, examples 
of which can be found in figure 1 and 2, then the IPO was classified as non-book-built.  
Table 3 shows a summary of the data divided by book-built IPOs and non-book-
built IPOs. Additionally, because of the historically observed difference in performance 
of IPOs of public utilities, the results for book-built and non-book-built IPOs excluding 
three IPOs of privatized public utility and public financial companies
8
, which are the only 
privatizations in the sample, were also generated. Because the differences of mean values 
in this no-privatizations sample from the sample containing all IPOs were found not to be 
statistically significant, the generated statistics for the no-privatizations sample are not 
shown. 
Capital market uncertainty: 
 Capital market uncertainly is a possible reason firms would elect to use a book-
building method rather than a non-book-building method. To measure capital market 
uncertainty, I measure the runup of the market index over the 90 day period prior to the 
final issue date of the IPO. The market index I use is the Philippine Stock Exchange 
Index (PSEi) which is the main index of the PSE and is comprised of a fixed basket of the 
30 largest and most active common stocks on the PSE. 
Issuers want to ensure there is adequate demand for the offering and that the issue 
is priced correctly. Book-building’s process of information gathering reduces uncertainty 
                                                          
8
 Manila Water Corporation (2005), Electric Development Corporation (2006) and National Reinsurance 
Corporation of the Philippines (2007) 
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regarding demand for the issuance and allows the underwriter to easily revise the price. 
Panel a in table 3 gives evidence for this theory, showing that on average there is a larger 
amount of uncertainty during periods when book-built IPOs occur.  
Issue cost: 
 In answering the question of why book-building is preferred by issuers, previous 
literature from developed markets suggests there is a trade-off between the higher issue 
cost associated with book-building due the higher effort expended by the underwriter, 
and the benefits of greater information on demand. Congruent with other studies on issue 
cost such as that of Kutsuna and Smith (2003), I define total issue cost as the sum of 
underwriting fees and underpricing. In panel b of table 3 I standardize total issue costs by 
offer price as is commonly done. Kutsuna and Smith (2003) however argue that this 
standardization technique econometrically weights outlier issues too heavily and that 
conceptually, total issue cost is better measured as the percentage difference between 
market value and net issue proceeds. Thus, in panel c of table 3 I standardize total issue 
cost by the first aftermarket price.   
 In contrast to most literature from developed countries on total issue cost between 
book-building and non-book-building IPOs, my data shows that book-building is than 
non-book-building from a total issue cost perspective. Looking at the components of total 
issue cost, underwriter fees is not the driver of the difference in cost with underwriter fees 
set at about 3.1% for both book-building and non-book-building. This is consistent with 
my interviews with industry professionals who cite intense competition and the SEC 
mandated cap on underwriter fees of 5% of issue size as the reasons for the tight band 
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around fees. Thus, the driver of the difference in total issue cost in the Philippines is 
underpricing. Compared to underpricing as measured by first day initial returns in the US 
from 1980-2001 as measured by Ritter and Welch (2002) of 20%, and Kutsuna and Smith 
(2003) in Japan of 36%, underpricing in my data set is significantly less at around 11% 
across all IPOs. 
 Given the advantage of book-building of greater information, less uncertainty and 
the ability to allocate shares, it is puzzling why underwriters would not charge a premium 
above non-bookbuilt offerings or why an issuer would have chosen a non-bookbuilt 
option if they appear to be more expensive. Practitioners from large banks in the 
Philippines point to size of the offering as the explanation. Speaking with an investment 
banker from Deutsche Bank in the Philippines and another at Bank of the Philippine 
Islands Capital Markets, both said that their banks did not look at deals the size of those 
that were non-bookbuilt in my data set as the economics did not make sense even if 
priced at the 5% underwriter fee cap.  
Offering size: 
 Looking at panel d of table 3, the difference in offering size between book-built 
and non-book-built IPOs corroborates the colloquial evidence taken from the interviews 
with practitioners. In terms of total capital raised, primary capital raised, and secondary 
capital raised, bookbuilt offerings are at least one order of magnitude larger than non-
bookbuilt offerings. Correspondingly, this means an order of magnitude of order 
difference in underwriting fees. Even with the lesser amount of work required from an 
underwriter during a non-bookbuilt deal, the smaller economics of non-bookbuilt deals in 
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the Philippines means that most of the larger banks do not participate in the market. This 
leaves the space open to more niche competitors who may have different cost structures 
that allow the economics of the small, non-bookbuilt deals to work. Abacus Capital and 
Investment Corporation, ranked 115
th
 in the Philippine Equity deals league table 
according to Bloomberg by deal volume since 1999, performed 1 of every 3 non-
bookbuilt deals in the sample and has been the lead underwriter on the last five non-
bookbuilt deals in the country. In general, it seems that there is less of a “choice” for 
issuers between book-building and non-book-building which helps to explain the 
conundrum with total issue costs. Small issuers, even if willing to pay in the upper range 
of fees, are overlooked by banks who have the resources and network of investors to 
perform a book-building process and thus turn to niche underwriters to IPO. These niche 
firms, with less competition from traditional underwriters, are able to charge a slight 
premium in fees. Conversely, traditional underwriters who book-build offerings face 
more competition (increasingly from large multinational banks) and thus are unable to 
charge a higher fee.  
 Additionally, panel d seems to refute the statement that issuers looking to simply 
exit their investment in a company and thus don’t care about the aftermarket performance 
of the shares would choose a non-bookbuilt option. The amount of secondary proceeds as 
a percentage of total equity in non-bookbuilt offerings is less than that in book-built 
offerings. Given the low cost of book-building in the Philippines, it can be speculated that 
the lower amount of underpricing from bookbuilt IPOs (and thus less money left on the 
table) outweighs the lower fee that issuers would pay if they elected to use a non-book-
built IPO. 
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Company characteristics: 
 The last panel of table 3, panel e, displays the company characteristics of issuing 
companies. Unsurprisingly, given the results related to offer size, larger companies in 
terms of market cap, who tend to have more employees and a longer operating tenure, 
elect to use book-building more. In terms of operating metrics, column 2 which includes 
all 28 observations of non-bookbuilt IPOIs is misleading due to the inclusion of the 2007 
IPO of Anchor Land Holdings, Inc (ALHI) which IPO-ed with 381B Php in revenue and 
a net income of 56B Php. Removing the outlier in column 3 gives a clearer picture of the 
data and doesn’t change any of the conclusions mentioned above so far. The only 
material difference is in the mean of sales revenue, net income and sales growth for non-
bookbuilt firms. Once again, as expected with a sample of younger, smaller firms, the 
mean amount of revenue and income for companies that choose not to book-build are 
significantly less than those who do. Correspondingly, these non-book-built have higher 
sales growth metrics. 
 While the benefits of book-building seem most suited to firms with high 
asymmetric information, such as new, smaller, high growth firms, these types of firms 
seem to use non-book-building methods. As discussed above, the lack of choice may be 
driving these high-information asymmetry firms to use non-book-building methods. 
Given this, as can be seen in figure 8, it is no surprise that the vast majority of firms that 
have IPO-ed in the Small and Medium Enterprise sector (SME) decided not to book-
build.  
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V. Regression Results 
 To further empirically investigate the choice to bookbuild and determination of 
issue costs, I regress select company and issue characteristics against the binary variable 
of bookbuilt versus non-bookbuilt in tables 4 and 5, against underwriter fees in table 6 
and against underpricing in table 6. All regressions exclude the outlier of ALHI due to the 
reasons previously mentioned. 
The choice to book-build: 
Table 3 presents the results of a linear regression with the binary choice to book-
build or not as the dependent variable and select company and offering characteristics. 
The regression gives similar results to Kumar (2008) in the Indian market who found that 
only size and underwriter’s reputation were statistically significant in determining 
whether a firm chose to use a book-building process or not. I omit my measure of 
underwriter reputation, a binary variable of whether or not the underwriter was in the top 
10 of the league table by deal volume, since all top 10 underwriters in my sample only 
use book-building. My linear regression finds that only the constant is significant at the 
1% level. Market cap and the SME sector are significant at the 5% level while the 
property sector is significant at the 10% level.  
For comparison, the marginal effects of a probit regression are displayed in Table 
4. At the 10% level, age of the firm and the mining and oil sector are significant. At the 
5% level, market cap is significant. At the 1% level the holding firm sector is significant. 
Unlike the linear regression, has easily interpretable regression coefficients where a 1 
unit change in the independent variable results in a percentage increase in the conditional 
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probability of the dependent variable occurring equal to the magnitude of the coefficient 
on the independent variable, all else being equal. Using holding firms as an example, 
because all holding firms in my sample chose to use book-building, the model predicts 
that holding all other explanatory variables constant, a firm that registers their sector as a 
holding company is 100% more likely to use book-building compared to a company that 
does not register their sector as a holding company. Between the two regressions, only 
market cap remains statistically significant. The sign is in the expected direction, 
indicating that the larger the company, the more likely book-building is used. 
Nevertheless, the magnitude of the marginal probability is extremely small. In order for a 
the conditional probability of book-building to increase by 1.00%, the market cap (given 
in mm Php) of a company would have to increase by about 50 trillion Php.  Given that 
the range between the largest IPO in the sample (Travelers International Hotel Group, 
Inc.) and smallest (Information Capital Technology Ventures) is about 180B, the 
magnitude of the effect of market cap seems insignificant once other variables are 
controlled for.  
Interestingly, a more sophisticated shareholder base at the time of IPO, proxied 
here by a firm having a large amount of foreign shareholders and / or having the majority 
of the firm owned by non-individuals (such as funds or other companies) and / or being a 
subsidiary of a foreign corporation, does not seem to be significant in determining the 
book-building decision. Worth noting as well is that in both regressions, the secondary 
proceeds as a percentage of the market value of equity at the time of offering just misses 
being significant at the 10% level, coming in at between 11% - 12% in the linear and 
probit models. The sign is the opposite direction than expected. An offering with a large 
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secondary amount would mean a large amount of shareholders looking to liquidate their 
investment in the company. It could be argued that these shareholders would not care 
about the aftermarket performance of the shares of the company and thus they would not 
be willing to pay for the more accurate pricing of book-building. In this case however, it 
can be speculated that for companies that have the option of using both book-built and 
non-bookbuilt methods, the increase in secondary proceeds from greater marketing and 
less underpricing associated with book-building outweighs the cost savings that would 
come with using a non-book-built process. 
Total issue cost: 
 The observation from the summary statistics in table 3 that book-building does 
not have a higher total issue cost than non-book-building is puzzling. The more effort that 
the underwriter expends on due diligence and the better their reputation, the more they 
should be able to charge either in the direct form of higher fees, or in the form of greater 
underpricing which represents a lower cost of investment in marketing and information 
gathering. The larger the problem of asymmetric information, the greater the effort 
required on both the marketing and information gathering front. Firms with longer track 
records and larger revenues should be arguably more well-known and less difficult to 
market and perform due diligence on. Furthermore if underwriters are able to compete on 
reputation and not just price, then they should justifiably be able to charge a premium. 
Kutsuna and Smith (2003) find that with auction IPOs (non-bookbuilt) they are unable to 
explain total issue cost, however with book-built IPOs the factors above are significant. 
They additionally find that the issue size is significant in determining total issue cost in 
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book-built IPOs, implying an economies-of-scale effect for underwriting. I add the binary 
variable of whether or not there is an international tranche of the issue, expecting that the 
greater disclosure requirements and additional marketing should allow foreign 
underwriters to charge a greater fee. Unfortunately, fees paid to in relation to 
international offerings are not disclosed however an interview with an investment banker 
at Deutsche Bank Philippines revealed that usually the disclosed fees to domestic 
underwriters are similar to those paid to international ones. For the regression on 
underpricing I also include underwriter fees which would be expected to be a factor in 
determining the level of underpricing if the two are substitute components of total issue 
cost and the determination of price would occur after agreement on the fee in the IPO 
process. I standardize the data by issue price, so that the underwriter fee model is not 
affected by underpricing. 
 Table 6 shows the linear regression results for total issue cost. Like Kutsuna and 
Smith (2003), I am unable to explain total issue cost from both a fee and underpricing 
perspective with only the constant being significant in both regressions. Unlike Kutsuna 
and Smith (2003) however, I am also unable to explain total issue cost for book-built 
issues as well. International and my measure of underwriter reputation, whether or not is 
in the top 10 of the league table, have either their corresponding interacted or non-
interacted variable omitted since all international offerings were book-built and top 10 
underwriters only performed book-built IPOs.  In aggregate, the model explains less than 
25% of the variation in underwriting fees, however this lack of explanation, I believe, is a 
useful result. The lack of effect of any variables that have explanatory power in 
developed markets like Japan signals that underwriters, even those with global 
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operations, operate differently in the Philippines. While it is argued underwriters should 
favor book-building because it gives underwriters more control over their compensation 
structure, it doesn’t seem that book-builders in the Philippines possess that form of 
market power.  
VI. Further empirical investigation 
 Given the entire sample of firms that have IPO-ed in the Philippines since the 
introduction of book-building as a pricing method in 1998, I am led to four conclusions: 
1) The size of a company determines whether a company uses book-building to price 
their IPO or not, 2) however not small companies do not have the choice to book-build 
due to the absence of service provided by underwriters who find their issue size 
uneconomical. 3) Book-building is cheaper from a total issue cost perspective and has a 
lower amount of underpricing. Along with the marketing and discretionary allocation 
benefits book-building offers, this seems like a plausible explanation as to why book-
building has become the dominant pricing mechanism in the Philippines, however 4) I am 
unable to empirically explain why book-building is has a lower issue cost as a percentage 
of total offering proceeds.  
 The wide variance of firm size in the Philippines combined with the low volume 
of deals creates the bifurcated market that leads to conclusion (2). Figure 13 charts the 
logged market cap of all 70 firms against the binary decision variable of book-built or 
not. At the edges, there is a clear tendency for the smallest firms to not use book-building 
and for the largest firms to use book-building. There is an overlapping area however in 
market caps with the magnitude of 100 mm Php to 10 B Php. This subset of firms is 
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interesting given that they are firms of relatively equal size in terms of market cap who 
presumably had the true choice of using book-built pricing or not. This may not be 
precise given that it may be the case that over time more underwriters entered the book-
building market and thus allowed smaller firms to issue or that early in the period large 
firms elected to still use the legacy non-book-built method because of lack of education 
on the new method. Nevertheless the sample presents a better opportunity to study the 
choice to book-build or not. To gain a rough empirical understanding of this set of firms, 
I create an adhoc sample consisting 17 of firms that are in in one of the two buckets: 1) 
used book-building and had a market cap less than 1 B Php, or 2) used non-book-building 
and had a market cap greater than 1B Php.  
 Table 7 shows the results of the linear regression of the sample for the choice of 
firms to book-build or not. Unlike the low explanatory power of the table 4 which 
includes the whole sample of firms, the linear regression of the subset of firms has strong 
explanatory power with an    over 90%. Market cap comes out significant again but with 
a negative sign which is expected given that the sample was created so that all book-built 
firms were smaller than non-book-built ones.  Interestingly, the only other variable 
significant at the 10% level is the binary variable of large foreign shareholders. I define a 
firm with a large amount of foreign shareholders to be a firm with more than 30% of its 
common equity held by persons or institutions of a nationality outside of the Philippines 
at the time of IPO. Given that book-building is relatively new to the Philippines but has 
been used extensively abroad, and that foreign investors tend to be more sophisticated 
than local Filipino investors, it makes sense that companies with more foreign investor 
pressure would use a book-building process. This would also seem to imply, that as 
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Filipino businesses and investors continue to become more sophisticated, the existence of 
non-book-building methods will tend in the same direction as countries like Japan and 
become extremely scarce as companies that truly have the option of choosing their IPO 
pricing mechanism elect to use the book-building method.  
VII. Conclusion 
While the continued moderate appearance of non-book-built IPOs in the Philippines over 
recent years is a rarity on the global scale, the Philippines is not an exception to the rule 
that is the tendency of book-building to dominate non-book-building methods in IPO 
pricing. The heavy competition for business in South East Asia equity market, the 
regulatory cap on fees, and the precedent set by historically low fees before book-
building increases willingness of domestic and international underwriters to accept low-
single-digit fees. Interestingly, underwriters don’t seem to substitute lower fees with 
more underpricing as is found abroad. Equally interesting, is the fact that investors are 
willing to reveal truthful information to such an extent given the Philippine regulations 
on allocation. Given that the argument for more accurate pricing under book-building is 
the information gathered from (primarily) institutional investors, and that the incentive 
for investors to reveal information is allocation, in a system that reduces the potential 
allocation that institutional buyers can receive, one would expect there to be more 
underpricing. Abnormally strong demand for Philippine public shares could be one 
reason, looking at the run-up of the PSEi in figure 7 over the period supports the claim. 
An alternative explanation is the youth of the market. Loughran and Ritter (2002) find 
that in the US, average initial underpricing in 1980 was about 7% which is where the 
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Philippines is now. Over the course of 20 years however the number rose to about 65%. 
The increasing valuations of companies over time and agency problems between 
underwriters and issuing firms are the primary factors they attribute this to. Figure 11 
shows book-built IPO underpricing in the Philippines trending up as time has progressed, 
suggesting that the infancy of the market is responsible for the anomaly of issue costs in 
the market. 
Nevertheless, given that book-building in the Philippines was cheaper from a total 
issue cost perspective and results in better deal performance (figure 10 shows the 
majority of deals for which oversubscription occurred where for book-built IPOs), what 
explains why 40% of IPOs since 1998 didn’t use book-building? 
The first reason is that very small firms with small offering sizes do not have 
access to banks who offer book-building services. The percentage fees of small offerings 
are unattractive to book-building banks and thus these offerings are overlooked. Because 
the volume of deals is tight, the strategy of middle market banks, like those in the US, 
who operate by doing more deals of smaller sizes, is also unviable. In addition, it is 
difficult for a niche player to enter the space and provide book-building services to small 
players due to the high barriers of entry that exist within the book-building space such as 
a network of investors and relationships with advisors such as law firms (who the 
underwriter can introduce to the issuer for the offering) both of which usually require 
scale. 
For firms large enough to choose between book-building and non-book-building, 
the developing nature of the market and investors at a macro level and the concentration 
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of foreign shareholders at a firm-specific level are possible explanations. Change can be 
difficult, especially for a developing market with unclear regulations and processes. In 
aspects, doing things as they have always been done is a viable argument. In support of 
this, given the heavily relationship-driven nature of finance and the fact that only 
domestic underwriters provide non-book-built offerings, legacy relationships could lead a 
firm to choose not to use a book-building pricing process. The virtual non-existence of a 
private equity market in the Philippines also means that most firms IPO with limited 
foreign ownership, only allowing foreign capital to flow in through the public markets. 
The more sophisticated shareholder base and management teams of countries such as 
Japan that understand the book-building process may be the reason why non-book-built 
IPOs disappeared rapidly in the country after the introduction of book-building at 
relatively the same time as the Philippines.  
In conversations with investors and underwriters in the Philippines, the 
introduction of book-building has been over all a good thing for the Philippine economy. 
Book-building encourages firms that may not have succeeded in a fixed-price offering or 
auction due to a high amount of information asymmetry to access the public markets for 
funding. IPO volume is clearly a sign of a more functional market. More importantly, the 
scrutiny that comes with being a public company, which ironically recently has been 
criticized for being a corrupter of incentives and a major friction in the US, in my opinion 
is healthy for companies in the Philippines. Accountability and transparency forced upon 
public firms are two qualities that a country that ranks in the top quartile for corruption
9
 
should desire. Undoubtedly the IPO market in the Philippines in the next decade will not 
                                                          
9
 According to Transparency International’s Corruption Index as of 2014 
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exhibit the same features as I find in this paper. Institutional pressure against the SEC to 
change the allocation requirements to local investors and to raise the fee cap will have 
large effects if pushed through. The Philippines is projected to be the fourth fastest 
growing economy of 2015 and inflows of both talent and capital from abroad will occur. 
Balancing the needs of a bifurcated market consisting of multibillion dollar multinational 
conglomerates and couple-of-million dollar SMEs will be a huge challenge, and the more 
academic and practical research that is devoted to the topic, the better prepared my 
country will be.  
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IX. Figures 
Figure 1: This page shows the different situations through which a company may list in 
the PSE by way of introduction. Information is from Pg 1 of the March 9, 2011 
memorandum by the PSE to the investing public and market participants on the subject of 
Amended Rules on Listing by Way of Introduction 
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Figure 2: This page is from the “Determination of Offer Price” section of the prospectus 
of Crown Asia Chemicals Corporation (2015). It is an example of a non-book-built 
offering, classified as such because the section doesn’t explicitly mention book-building. 
Instead the final issue price is set by the underwriter and doesn’t incorporate information 
from investors in pricing.  
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Figure 3: This page is from the “Pricing and Dilution” section of the prospectus of 
Jolliville Holdings Corporation (2002). It is an example of a non-book-built offer, 
classified as such because it doesn’t explicitly mention book-building. Instead the issue 
price is determined by an NAV calculation by the underwriter.  
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Figure 4: This page is from the “Determination of Offer Price” section of the prospectus 
of SBS Philippines Corporation (2015). It is an example of a book-built offering as 
identified from the explicit mention of a book-building process in the first sentence of the 
prospectus. Though the underwriter may perform calculations to determine a price range, 
the final price takes into account information gathered through the book-building process.  
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Figure 5: This figure shows the number of book-built IPOs, non-book-built IPOs and 
total number of IPOs on the PSE in the Philippines per year since 1998. 
 
Figure 6: This figure shows the volume of total capital raised of book-built IPOs, non-
book-built IPOs and total number of IPOs on the PSE in the Philippines per year since 
1998. 
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Figure 7: This figure shows the sum of annual trading volume (left hand side axis) and 
the closing price on the last day of the year (right hand side axis) for the Philippine Stock 
Exchange Index (PSEi). 
 
Figure 8: This shows all IPOs on the PSE during the time period of January 1998 -  
August 2015, both book-built and non-book-built, categorized by the primary sector the 
company registered for their IPO.  
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Figure 9: This shows all IPOs on the PSE during the time period of January 1998 -  
August 2015, both book-built and non-book-built, categorized by the use of proceeds 
mentioned on the IPO prospectus in the “Use of Proceeds” section. IPO prospectuses that 
stated more than one use for the proceeds or said that the proceeds were for general use 
were classified as “General”. IPO prospectuses that stated that the proceeds were only 
going towards one specific business project, such as the purchase of a factory or an 
acquisition of another company, were classified as “Specific project investment”. IPO 
prospectuses that stated that the proceeds were only being used to pay down debt were 
classified as “Debt repayment”. 
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Figure 10: This figure shows additional information on IPOs on the PSE during the time 
period of January 1998 - August 2015, both book-built and non-book-built. An IPO is 
classified as oversubscribed if there was a follow-on offering for the IPO, meaning during 
the original IPO there were more shares demanded than offered and the issuer decided to 
offer more shares on either the same date or slightly later date. The average number of 
underwriters shows how on average how many banks were listed as underwriters, 
including the lead underwriter(s), on deals over the period. An IPO was classified as 
having a top 10 lead underwriter if the lead underwriter on the IPO was in the top 10 on 
the league table of equity deal volume in pesos in the Philippines from 1999 – 2015. An 
IPO was classified as an international offering if there were shares offered and sold 
outside of the Philippines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
Oversubscibed Avg # of underwriters "Top 10" Lead
underwriter
International offering
# 
o
f 
IP
O
s 
Book built
Non-book built
38 
 
Figure 11: This figure shows the average underpricing of book-built IPOs during each 
year, as measured as the percentage return using the IPO offering price and first 
aftermarket trading price, during the time period of January 1998 – August 2015.  
 
Figure 12: This figure shows additional information on IPO-ing companies on the PSE 
during the time period of January 1998 - August 2015, both book-built and non-book-
built. A company was classified as a subsidiary of a foreign corporation if in the 
“Business overview” (or similar section) section of the IPO prospectus it is explicitly 
mentioned that the company is a subsidiary of a company headquartered outside of the 
Philippines. A company was classified as having majority non-individual shareholders if 
more than 50% of the holders of common stock pre-IPO were not individual people. A 
company was classified as having large foreign ownership if more than 30% of the 
holders of common stock pre-IPO were registered as having a non-Filipino nationality.  
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Figure 13: This figure charts all IPOs on the PSE during the time period of 1998 – 2015, 
with the binary variable of whether or not the offer was book-built on the vertical axis, 
and the log of the market cap of the IPO-ing company on the horizontal axis. The dotted 
lines are a rough approximation of the range of companies which have similar market 
caps but have a mix of book-built and non-book-built IPOs. 
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X. Tables 
Table 1: This table shows the criteria for listing on the different boards on the PSE prior 
to 2013.  Information was gathered from the “Philippine Stock Exchange” section of 
multiple IPO prospectuses pre-2013. 
 
 First Board Second Board SME board 
Minimum years of 
operation 
5 1 1 
Market 
Capitalization 
(mm) 
500 Php 100 Php N/A 
Other board 
specific 
 Track record of 
profitable 
operations for 3 
years 
 
 Net tangible 
assets of at 
least 500 Php 
 Demonstrate 
potential for 
superior growth 
 
 Minimum capital 
requirement of 
100 Php 
 Prospects of 
further growth 
and 
profitability  
 Authorized 
capital stock of 
20 Php - 100 
Php 
 Track record of 
at least 1 year 
of positive 
EBITDA 
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Table 2: This table from the PSE website (www.PSE.com.ph) shows the criteria for 
listing on the two different boards on the PSE post-2013. 
 
MAIN BOARD SME BOARD 
GENERAL CRITERIA 
a. The Applicant Company must have a positive stockholders' equity in the fiscal year immediately 
preceding the filing of the listing application. 
b. The Applicant Company operating history of at least three (3) years prior to its listing application. 
c. The Applicant Company shall cause all its subscribed shares of the same type and class applied for 
listing to be paid in full. 
d. The minimum offering to the public for initial listing shall be based on the following schedule: 
Market Capitalization Public Offer 
Not exceeding P500M 33% or P50M, whichever is 
higher 
Over P500M to P1B 25% or P100M, whichever 
is higher 
Over P1B to P5B 20% or P250M, whichever 
is higher 
Over P5B to P10B 15% of P750M, whichever 
is higher 
Over P10B 10% of P1B, whichever is 
higher 
e.  
f. When required by the Exchange, the Applicant Company shall engage the services of an 
independent appraiser duly accredited by the Exchange and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission ("SEC") in determining the value of their assets. 
g. The Applicant Company shall have an investor relation program to ensure that information affecting 
the company are communicated effectively to investors. Such program shall include, at the 
minimum, a corporate website that contains, at the minimum, the following information: 
 
 
i. Company information - organizational structure, board of directors, and management team 
ii. Company news - analyst briefing report, latest news, press releases, newsletter (if any) 
iii. Financial report - annual and quarterly reports, at least for the past two (2) years 
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iv. Disclosures - recent disclosures to PSE and SEC for the past two (2) years 
v. Investor FAQs - commonly asked questions of stockholders 
vi. Investor Contact - email address for feedback/ comments, shareholder assistance and service 
vii. Stock Information - key figures, dividends, and stock information 
 
TRACK RECORD REQUIREMENT 
a. A cumulative consolidated earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA), excluding non-recurring items, of 
at least P50 Million for three (3) full fiscal 
years immediately preceding the application 
for listing; 
b. A minimum EBITDA of P10 Million for each 
of the three (3) fiscal years; and 
c. The applicant company must be engaged in 
materially the same business(es) and must 
have a proven track record of management 
throughout the last three (3) years prior to the 
filing of the application. 
 
Exceptions to the 3-year track record 
requirement: 
   (i).  The Applicant Company has been operating for at 
least ten (10) years prior to the filing of the 
application and has a cumulative EBITDA of at 
least P50 Million for at least two (2) of the three 
(3) fiscal years immediately preceding the filing of 
the listing application; 
  (ii). The Applicant Company is a newly formed holding 
company which uses the operational track record 
of its subsidiary. However, the newly formed 
holding company is prohibited from divesting its 
shareholdings in the said subsidiary for a period 
of three (3) years from the listing of its securities. 
The prohibition shall not apply if a divestment 
plan is approved by majority of the Applicant 
Company's stockholders. 
a. A cumulative earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), 
excluding non-recurring items, of at least 
P15 Million for three (3) fiscal years 
immediately preceding the application for 
listing; 
b. A positive EBITDA was generated in at least 
two (2) of the last three (3) fiscal years, 
including the fiscal year immediately 
preceding the filing of the application; and 
c. The Applicant Company must be engaged in 
materially the same business and must have a 
proven track record of management 
throughout the last three (3) years prior to the 
filing of the application for listing. 
 
The Applicant Company shall demonstrate its 
stable financial condition and prospects for 
continuing growth by providing a business plan 
indicating the steps that have been taken and to 
be undertaken in order to advance its business 
over a period of five (5) years. 
 
As a general rule, financial projections are not 
required, but should there be references made in 
the business plan to future profits or losses, or 
any other item that would be construed to 
indicate forecasts, then the Applicant Company 
is required to include financial projections in the 
business plan duly reviewed by an independent 
accounting firm. 
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MINIMUM CAPITAL REQUIREMENT 
Minimum authorized capital stock of P500M, of 
which, at least 25% is subscribed and fully paid. 
At listing, the market capitalization of the 
Applicant Company must be at least P500M. 
Minimum authorized capital stock of P100M, of 
which, at least 25% is subscribed and fully paid. 
MINIMUM NUMBER OF STOCKHOLDERS 
Upon listing, at least 1,000 stockholders each 
owning stocks equivalent to at least one (1) board 
lot. 
Upon listing, at least 200 stockholders each 
owning stocks equivalent to at least one (1) 
board lot. 
RESTRICTIONS 
a. No divestment of shares in operating 
subsidiary - A newly formed holding company 
which invokes the operational track record of 
its subsidiary to qualify for the track record 
requirement of profitable operations, is 
prohibited from divesting its shareholdings in 
the said subsidiary for a period of three (3) 
years from the listing of its securities. The 
prohibition shall not apply if a divestment plan 
is approved by majority of the Applicant 
Company's stockholders. 
b. No secondary offering for companies invoking 
exemption of track record and operating 
history requirements, such as mining, 
petroleum and renewable energy companies 
and newly formed holding companies during 
the initial public offering. 
a. No listing of holding, portfolio and passive 
income companies; 
b. No change in primary purpose and/or 
secondary purpose for a period of seven (7) 
years following its listing; and 
c. No offering of secondary securities for 
companies exempt from the track record and 
operating history requirements such as 
mining, petroleum and renewable energy 
companies. 
LOCK-UP 
An Applicant Company shall cause it existing 
stockholders who own an equivalent of at least 
10% of the issued and outstanding shares of stock 
of the company to refrain from selling, assigning 
or in any manner disposing of their shares for a 
An Applicant Company shall cause its existing 
stockholders to refrain from selling, assigning, 
encumbering or in any manner disposing of their 
shares for a period of one (1) year after the 
listing of such shares. 
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period of: 
   (i).  One hundred eighty (180) days after the listing of 
said shares if the Applicant Company meets the 
track record requirements; or 
   (ii). Three hundred sixty-five (365) days after listing of 
said shares if the Applicant Company is exempt 
from the track record and operating history 
requirements. 
If there is any issuance or transfer of shares (i.e., 
private placements, asset for shares swap or a 
similar transaction) or instruments which lead to 
issuance of shares (i.e., convertible bonds, 
warrants or a similar instrument) done and fully 
paid for within One hundred eighty (180) days 
prior to the start of the offering period, or, prior to 
listing date in case of companies listing by way of 
introduction, and the transaction price is lower 
than that of the offer price in the Initial Public 
Offering, or listing price for a listing by way of 
introduction, all shares availed of shall be subject 
to a lock-up period of at least Three hundred 
sixty-five (365) days from full payment of the 
aforesaid shares. 
 
The lock-up requirement shall be stated in the 
Articles of Incorporation of the Applicant 
Company. 
If there is any issuance or transfer of shares (i.e., 
private placements, asset for shares swap or a 
similar transaction) or instruments which lead to 
issuance of shares (i.e., convertible bonds, 
warrants or a similar instrument) done and fully 
paid for within six (6) months prior to the start of 
the offering period, or, prior to listing date in 
case of companies listing by way of introduction, 
and the transaction price is lower than that of the 
offer price in the initial public offering, or listing 
price for listing by way of introduction, all 
shares subscribed or acquired shall be subject to 
a lock-up period of at least one (1) year from 
listing of the aforesaid shares. 
 
The lock-up requirement shall be stated in the 
Articles of Incorporation of the Applicant 
Company. 
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Table 3: This table shows descriptive statistics for the dataset of IPOs on the PSE from 
January 1998 – August 2015. There are summary statistics for these four different sample 
populations of the dataset: All IPOs in the dataset, only book-built IPOs in the dataset, 
only non-book-built IPOs in the dataset, and only non-book-built IPOs in the dataset 
excluding the IPO of ALHI. The table also displays the results of t-tests testing for the 
difference between means of the different sample populations. 
    
All 
 
Excluding 
ALHI 
 
T-test value 
  
Entire 
sample 
 
Book-
building 
(1) 
Non-
book-
building 
(2) 
 
Non-
book-
building 
(3) 
 
1 = 2 1 = 3 
# of 
observations   70   42 28   27       
Panel (a) Capital market uncertainty                   
PSEi market runup (day -90 to day 0) 3.4% 
 
3.8% 2.8% 
 
2.9% 
 
(0.37) (0.33) 
Std. Deviation 10.8% 
 
11.0% 10.5% 
 
10.7% 
   Panel (b) Total issue cost (% of IPO gross proceeds)                 
Average underwriter fees  3.1% 
 
3.0% 3.1% 
 
3.1% 
 
0.53 0.40  
Std. Deviation 0.5% 
 
0.4% 0.7% 
 
0.7% 
   Average Initial Return 10.7% 
 
8.7% 13.8% 
 
14.6% 
 
1.20   1.40* 
Std. Deviation 17.3% 
 
15.9% 19.2% 
 
19.0% 
   Total Cost 
 
13.8% 
 
11.7% 16.9% 
 
17.7% 
 
1.23   1.42* 
Std. Deviation 17.3% 
 
15.9% 19.2% 
 
19.0% 
   Panel (c) Total issue cost (% of first aftermarket value)                 
Average underwriter fees  2.8% 
 
2.9% 2.8% 
 
2.7% 
 
(0.36) (0.60) 
Std. Deviation 0.7% 
 
0.6% 0.8% 
 
0.8% 
   Average Initial Return 9.1% 
 
7.4% 11.6% 
 
12.4% 
 
1.19   1.41* 
Std. Deviation 14.6% 
 
13.6% 16.0% 
 
15.7% 
   Total Cost 
 
11.9% 
 
10.3% 14.4% 
 
15.8% 
 
1.21   1.42* 
Std. Deviation 14.6% 
 
13.6% 16.0% 
 
15.3% 
   Panel (d) Offering characteristics                   
Total capital raised (Php mm) $3,823 
 
$6,130 $362 
 
$347 
 
       
(3.70)*** 
       
(3.64)*** 
Std. Deviation $6,961 
 
$8,229 $556 
 
$548 
   
Primary capital raised (Php mm) $2,759 
 
$4,391 $311 
 
$347 
 
      
(3.16)*** 
      
(3.12)*** 
Std. Deviation $5,619 
 
$6,792 $545 
 
$561 
   
Secondary capital raised (Php mm) $1,064 
 
$1,739 $51 
 
$53 
 
    
(2.32)** 
    
(2.27)** 
Std. Deviation $3,078 
 
$3,841 $155 
 
$158 
   Average % of company equity offered total 28.1% 
 
27.0% 29.8% 
 
30.0% 
 
1.14 1.19 
Std. Deviation 10.2% 
 
10.7% 9.3% 
 
9.4% 
   
Average % of company equity offered secondary 5.7% 
 
7.9% 2.4% 
 
2.5% 
 
     
(2.06)** 
    
(1.99)** 
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Std. Deviation 11.1% 
 
13.1% 5.9% 
 
6.0% 
   Panel (e) Company characteristics                   
Market cap (Php mm) $16,550 
 
$26,640 $1,407 
 
$1,340 
 
        
(3.33)*** 
       
(3.27)*** 
Std. Deviation $33,290 
 
$40,020 $1,916 
 
$1,920 
   
Number of employees 1,416 
 
2,224 159 
 
163 
 
      
(2.79)** 
     
(2.74)** 
Std. Deviation 3,142 
 
3,822 288 
 
292 
   
Age of issuing firm 15 
 
18 10 
 
10 
 
      
(2.29)** 
     
(2.20)** 
Std. Deviation 15 
 
17 10 
 
10 
   
Sales revenue (Php mm) $12,080 
 
$10,110 $15,180 
 
$522 
 
0.42 
       
(3.37)*** 
Std. Deviation $47,390 
 
$14,170 $74,770 
 
$855 
   
Net Income (Php mm) $1,706 
 
$1,417 $2,145 
 
$72 
 
0.42 
       
(2.98)*** 
Std. Deviation $6,948 
 
$2,290 $10,770 
 
$176 
   Last year's sales growth 25.4% 
 
16.9% 39.7% 
 
40.4% 
 
     2.17**     2.19** 
Std. Deviation 41.9%   23.7% 59.2%   60.4%       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1          
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Table 4: This table shows the results of a linear regression of different factors against the 
binary dependent variable of whether an IPO is book-built or not. The outlier of ALHI is 
excluded from the sample. Because of the binary nature of the dependent variable, the 
signs on the coefficients can indicate the direction of the relationship but the magnitudes 
of the coefficients are not directly interpretable. 
  (1) 
VARIABLES book-built 
    
runup 0.774 
 
(0.599) 
negativeearnings 0.264 
 
(0.372) 
age 0.000588 
 
(0.00459) 
mcap 5.55e-06** 
 
(2.18e-06) 
shareofequity_s 0.964 
 
(0.596) 
largeforeignshareholders -0.106 
 
(0.276) 
nonindividual -0.0966 
 
(0.137) 
subsidiaryofforeigncorp 0.155 
 
(0.375) 
HoldingFirms -0.414 
 
(0.287) 
Industrial -0.160 
 
(0.170) 
MiningandOil -0.475 
 
(0.299) 
Property -0.564* 
 
(0.304) 
Services -0.183 
 
(0.182) 
SME -0.609** 
 
(0.256) 
Projectinvestment -0.360 
 
(0.224) 
Debtrepayment 0.416 
 
(0.304) 
Constant 0.719*** 
 
(0.172) 
  Observations 69 
R-squared 0.355 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: This table shows the marginal effects of a probit regression of different factors 
against the binary dependent variable of whether an IPO is book-built or not. The outlier 
of ALHI is excluded from the sample. In this regression, the coefficients represents the 
marginal increase in probability that the binary variable equals 1 given a 1 unit change in 
the independent variable and holding all else equal. 
  (1) 
VARIABLES book-built 
    
runup -8.44e-05 
 
(0.000574) 
age -3.59e-06* 
 
(2.31e-05) 
mcap 2.14e-08** 
 
(1.37e-07) 
shareofequity_s 0.000401 
 
(0.00267) 
largeforeignshareholders -0.000145 
 
(0.00111) 
nonindividual -3.74e-05 
 
(0.000244) 
subsidiaryofforeigncorp 1.42e-05 
 
(9.93e-05) 
HoldingFirms -1.000*** 
 
(0.000641) 
Industrial -5.24e-05 
 
(0.000365) 
MiningandOil -0.297* 
 
(0.633) 
Property -0.00578 
 
(0.0302) 
Services -5.74e-05 
 
(0.000429) 
SME -0.000938 
 
(0.00595) 
Projectinvestment -3.39e-05 
 
(0.000290) 
Debtrepayment 1.51e-05 
 
(0.000105) 
  Observations 69 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: This table shows the results of linear regressions on the two components of total 
issue cost: underwriter fees (here as a percentage of issue price) and underpricing (here as 
a percentage return of first traded price from issue price). The outlier of ALHI is 
excluded from the sample. 
  (1) 
 
  (2) 
VARIABLES uwfees_issue 
 
VARIABLES return_offer 
    
 
    
runup -0.00184 
 
runup 0.269 
 
(0.00664) 
  
(0.215) 
age 0.000131 
 
age -7.35e-05 
 
(0.000102) 
  
(0.00335) 
lyrev 1.30e-06 
 
lyrev 6.64e-05 
 
(2.02e-06) 
  
(6.53e-05) 
top10uw 0.00280 
 
top10uw -0.0200 
 
(0.00286) 
  
(0.0931) 
o.international - 
 
o.international - 
     capitalraised_t -3.64e-06 
 
capitalraised_t -5.00e-05 
 
(2.84e-06) 
  
(9.31e-05) 
bbage -8.79e-05 
 
bbage 0.000703 
 
(0.000108) 
  
(0.00352) 
bblyrev -1.39e-06 
 
bblyrev -6.94e-05 
 
(2.03e-06) 
  
(6.57e-05) 
o.bbtop10uw - 
 
o.bbtop10uw - 
     bbinternational -0.000525 
 
bbinternational -0.0464 
 
(0.00342) 
  
(0.110) 
bbcapitalraised_t 3.69e-06 
 
bbcapitalraised_t 5.17e-05 
 
(2.85e-06) 
  
(9.33e-05) 
Constant 0.0297*** 
 
uwfees_issue -5.528 
 
(0.00100) 
  
(4.205) 
   
Constant 0.286** 
    
(0.129) 
     Observations 69 
 
Observations 69 
R-squared 0.083 
 
R-squared 0.157 
Standard errors in parentheses Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: This table uses a sub-sample of 17 IPOs which are either 1) book-built and have 
a market cap under 1 billion Php or 2) non-book-built and over 1 billion Php. The results 
of a linear regression, which is the same as that run in table 4, of different factors against 
the binary dependent variable of whether an IPO is book-built or not are shown. Because 
of the binary nature of the dependent variable, the signs on the coefficients can indicate 
the direction of the relationship but the magnitudes of the coefficients are not directly 
interpretable. 
  (1) 
VARIABLES bookbuilt 
    
runup -0.238 
 
(1.698) 
negativeearnings 0.352 
 
(0.380) 
age -0.0233 
 
(0.0254) 
mcap -7.14e-10* 
 
(3.07e-10) 
shareofequity_s -0.730 
 
(2.066) 
largeforeignshareholders 1.173* 
 
(0.543) 
nonindividual 0.0793 
 
(0.237) 
o.subsidiaryofforeigncorp - 
  3.sector -0.546 
 
(0.288) 
4.sector 1.163 
 
(1.124) 
5.sector 1.863 
 
(1.252) 
6.sector -0.0142 
 
(0.338) 
2o.useofproceeds - 
  3.useofproceeds -1.620 
 
(1.522) 
Constant 1.620*** 
 
(0.264) 
  Observations 17 
R-squared 0.931 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: This table uses a sub-sample of 17 IPOs which are either 1) book-built and have 
a market cap under 1 billion Php or 2) non-book-built and over 1 billion Php. The results 
of linear regressions, the same as those shown in table 6, on the two components of total 
issue cost: underwriter fees (here as a percentage of issue price) and underpricing (here as 
a percentage return of first traded price from issue price) are shown. 
  (1) 
 
  (2) 
VARIABLES uwfees_issue 
 
VARIABLES 
return_off
er 
    
 
    
runup 0.00401 
 
runup 1.731** 
 
(0.00676) 
  
(0.596) 
age -8.55e-05 
 
age 
-
0.0244*** 
 
(6.09e-05) 
  
(0.00601) 
lyrev -2.71e-12* 
 
lyrev 
-6.19e-
10*** 
 
-1.35E-12 
  
(1.50e-10) 
o.top10uw - 
 
o.top10uw - 
     o.international - 
 
o.international - 
     
capitalraised_t -8.93e-12* 
 
capitalraised_t 
-1.53e-
09** 
 
(4.00e-12) 
  
(4.63e-10) 
bbage 4.61e-05 
 
bbage 0.0341** 
 
(0.000141) 
  
(0.0122) 
bblyrev 0 
 
bblyrev 8.43e-10 
 
(0) 
  
(4.36e-10) 
o.bbtop10uw - 
 
o.bbtop10uw - 
     o.bbinternational - 
 
o.bbinternational - 
     
bbcapitalraised_t -0 
 
bbcapitalraised_t 
-8.02e-
09*** 
 
(0) 
  
(1.99e-09) 
Constant 0.0371*** 
 
uwfees_issue -98.87** 
 
(0.00286) 
  
(34.96) 
   
Constant 4.520** 
    
(1.321) 
     Observations 17 
 
Observations 17 
R-squared 0.544 
 
R-squared 0.862 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
 
